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THE ISSUE CLASS
JOSEPH A. SEINER *
Abstract: In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court refused to
certify a proposed class of one and a half million female workers who had alleged
that the nation’s largest private employer had discriminated against them on the basis of their sex. The academic response to the case has been highly critical of the
Court’s decision. This Article does not weigh in on the debate of whether the Court
missed the mark. Instead, this Article addresses a more fundamental question that
has gone completely unexplored: what is the best tool currently available for workers to pursue systemic employment discrimination claims? Surveying the case law
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Article identifies one procedural tool that
offers substantial potential to workplace plaintiffs seeking to pursue systemic
claims: issue class certification. Rule 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the “issue class,” which in effect allows a court to certify common issues in a case while allowing the remaining issues to be litigated separately. The issue class is typically used where a case has a common set of facts but the plaintiffs
have suffered varying degrees of harm. This is precisely the situation that many
workplace claims present. This Article explains how the issue class is particularly
useful for systemic discrimination claims. The Article further examines why traditional class treatment often fails in workplace cases, and addresses how the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart could have benefitted from issue class certification. Finally, this
Article discusses some of the implications of using the issue class in employment
cases, and situates the Article in the context of the broader academic scholarship.
If you’re part of a group of employees working for a major U.S. corporation with a gripe about unfair treatment, your collective voices were potentially muffled [after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes].
—NBC News report, following the Wal-Mart decision

1

The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, heralded last term as
a game-changer in employment class actions, has lived up to the hype.
—Reuters News report, following the Wal-Mart decision

2

* Joseph Seiner is a professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law. The author
would like to thank Benjamin Gutman, Jocelyn Larkin, Suja Thomas, and Michael Zimmer for their
helpful thoughts on this Article. The author would like to thank those participants at the Law & Society Annual Meeting for their helpful comments on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart. Any
errors or misstatements are entirely my own.
1
Eve Tahmincioglu, Wal-Mart Ruling Raises the Bar for Class Actions, NBCNEWS.COM (June
21, 2011, 7:59:35 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43468398/ns/business-careers/t/wal-mart-rulingraises-bar-class-actions, archived at http://perma.cc/H4KB-G5E3.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the certification of one and a half million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart was not consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2). 3 The news reports and legal analysis of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart were largely uniform: the case was a devastating
setback for millions of workers across the nation.4 The academic scholarship
quickly followed suit, and decried the decision for significantly raising the bar
for workers wanting to file suit against employers that run afoul of civil rights
laws. 5 The media analysis and academic reaction to Wal-Mart have largely
been correct. The decision undoubtedly undermines the ability of workers to
vindicate their rights when they have suffered discrimination.
This Article does not take a position as to whether Wal-Mart was properly
decided. Instead of weighing in on the merits of the case, this Article addresses
the novel issue of how workplace plaintiffs can still act collectively following
the decision. This Article thus focuses on how employees can preserve the
class action mechanism when pursuing litigation after Wal-Mart.
There are numerous ways that plaintiffs can act collectively when pursuing employment discrimination claims, even in light of the Wal-Mart decision. 6 Previous work demonstrates that collateral estoppel, consolidation, and
other procedural mechanisms serve as examples of such tools.7 This Article
expands on that scholarship and focuses on one largely unexplored avenue to
collective action that is almost as effective as traditional class action litigation:
issue class certification. Although there is no complete substitute for the traditional class claim, the issue class offers enormous potential to be the best tool
currently available to workers pursuing class-wide employment discrimination
cases. 8
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a group of plaintiffs to certify
certain issues common among them, even when the putative class itself has not
been certified. Specifically, Rule 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate,
an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to par2
Andrew Longstreth, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Shakes Up Employment Class Actions, REUTERS (Jan.
9, 2012, 7:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/10/us-walmart-study-idUSTRE8090132
0120110, archived at http://perma.cc/78VS-VEGL.
3
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011).
4
See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (noting the news response to the Wal-Mart decision); infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (noting the scholarly response).
5
See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the critical reaction of scholars to the
Supreme Court’s decision).
6
See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
7
See generally Joseph Seiner, Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2014)
(addressing the possible procedural responses to the Wal-Mart decision).
8
See infra notes 261–267 and accompanying text.
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ticular issues.” 9 Even when a class has not been permitted to proceed under
Rule 23(b), then, litigants can still certify particular issues common to a class
under Rule 23(c)(4). 10 This Rule thus allows a court to “treat common things
in common and to distinguish the distinguishable.” 11
Issue class certification offers many of the traditional benefits of class
certification under Rule 23(b). 12 Most notably, the issue class provides trial
judges enormous flexibility when managing a systemic case of workplace
harm. 13 Although class claims are different, Rule 23(c)(4) allows the judge to
separate specific common questions in the case and resolve other issues individually. 14 The judge can thereby tailor the certified issues to the facts of the
specific case, thus leading to more efficient litigation. 15 In this way, issue class
certification also results in more streamlined proceedings. Courts can resolve
claims that touch on a common issue a single time, while allowing the remaining issues in the case to be litigated separately. 16
Issue class certification is especially useful in class action employment
discrimination cases, particularly after Wal-Mart. 17 This is because workplace
class action claims often present the two criteria often required for issue class
certification: (1) systemic litigation involving a common set of facts; and (2)
varying degrees of harm amongst the individual plaintiffs. 18 Indeed, a survey
of the case law and literature in this area reveals that three common factors are
often involved in the outcome of workplace litigation: common corporate poli-

9

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). Prior to the 2007 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
issue class certification was authorized by Rule 23(c)(4)(A). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (2006)
(repealed 2007). In 2007, subparts (A) and (B) were removed, and the issue class provision was relabeled 23(c)(4); the change did not alter the Rule’s substantive meaning. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1, advisory committee's note to 2007 amendment (“Subdivisions have been rearranged within some rules to
achieve greater clarity and simplicity.”); id. 23, advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment (“The
language of Rule 23 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them
more easily understood . . . .”).
10
See id. (c)(4) (allowing the certification of specific issues in a case).
11
See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790 (3d
ed. 2005) (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968)). 12 See infra notes
122–130 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of issue class certification).
12
See infra notes 122–130 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of issue class certification).
13
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790 (noting the flexibility that issue class certification can provide to the trial courts).
14
See id.
15
See id.
16
See id.
17
See infra notes 131–193 and accompanying text (discussing why Rule 23(c)(4) is particularly
appropriate for employment discrimination claims).
18
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); see also infra notes 97–121 and accompanying text (setting forth
the requirements of issue class certification).
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cies, common personnel, and common company practices. 19 Specifically, because employer policies affecting an employee’s terms, conditions, and privileges of employment are often uniform across a business, these cases will frequently present a common set of facts for numerous plaintiffs. 20 Moreover,
because the managers, supervisors, and executive officers are the same at a
particular company, there are often similar issues when these same “players”
are involved in the wrongdoing. Finally, workplaces typically involve common
practices—informal procedures or rules that are often more of an issue of corporate culture than written policy. Cases of discrimination frequently implicate
these common company practices. 21
Yet, despite their similarities, employment discrimination claims also vary
substantially from one another.22 Damages, for example, differ broadly among
discrimination claims. 23 That is, even when workplace claims arise from similar facts, the relief available to plaintiffs varies tremendously across workers.24
This is true because employees will often have different rates of pay and different positions at the company. 25 And, discrimination results in different degrees and kinds of psychological and emotional harm for individual workers.26
Each employee’s specific damages must therefore be determined on a case-bycase basis.
Given these similarities and differences, workplace claims are often ripe
for issue class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). Because they inherently vary,
discrimination claims will not always be suitable for traditional class treatment
under Rule 23(b), as the Wal-Mart case clearly demonstrates. As these systemic cases will often arise from the same set of facts and involve the same polices, practices, and personnel, however, there will frequently be common issues
that can be separated out and certified as an issue class. By resolving these
common issues on a class basis, courts can handle the litigation much more
efficiently. 27

19
See infra notes 137–162 and accompanying text (discussing the common issues in employment
proceedings).
20
See infra notes 137–162 and accompanying text.
21
See Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 353 (2008) (discussing an employer’s “often informal” regulations
and practices).
22
See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text (addressing how workplace claims frequently
differ from one another).
23
See infra notes 163–171 and accompanying text.
24
See generally Craig Robert Senn, Ending Discriminatory Damages, 64 ALA. L. REV. 187
(2012) (discussing damages provisions of federal employment discrimination statutes).
25
See infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 168–171 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 137–162 and accompanying text.
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In fact, plaintiffs effectively used issue class certification alleging workplace discrimination in a case against Merrill Lynch. 28 In 2012, in McReynolds
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that a group of seven hundred black brokers could
pursue the common issue of whether an employer’s policies of arranging teams
and distributing accounts had an adverse effect against minority workers.29 No
class was certified under Rule 23(b)(3), but Judge Richard Posner, writing for
a majority panel of the court, allowed this particular issue to be considered on
a class-wide basis under Rule 23(c)(4). 30 The court explained how its decision
comports with the holding of Wal-Mart, and how resolution of the particular
issue furthers the Supreme Court’s reasoning. 31 This case shows that use of the
issue class for workplace claims is more than theoretical, and that all employment discrimination plaintiffs contemplating systemic claims should consider
utilizing Rule 23(c)(4).
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the Wal-Mart case, and
discusses the widely held view that the decision largely eviscerates the civil
rights protections of millions of workers. 32 Next, Part II explains the contours of
Rule 23(c)(4) and how the issue class differs from traditional class treatment
under Rule 23(b). 33 It then clarifies why issue class certification is particularly
appropriate for employment discrimination cases, and explains how civil rights
plaintiffs can use the Rule to help avoid the negative implications of Wal-Mart.34
By way of example, it explores how Rule 23(c)(4) could be utilized in sexual
harassment cases—one of the most commonly brought employment discrimination claims. 35 Then, Part II navigates Judge Posner’s recent decision certifying
an issue class in a post Wal-Mart employment case. 36 It also examines how the
plaintiffs in Wal-Mart could have benefitted if they had pursued issue class certification rather than a traditional Rule 23(b) class.37 Finally, Part III discusses

28
See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338.
29
Id.
30
See id.
31
See id. at 482–92.
32
See infra notes 39–72 and accompanying text (discussing the Wal-Mart decision).
33
See infra notes 85–130 and accompanying text (discussing class actions generally and the issue
class).
34
See infra notes 131–193 and accompanying text (addressing how the issue class can be used in
employment discrimination cases).
35
See infra notes 176–193 and accompanying text (discussing how the issue class is particularly
useful in sexual harassment cases).
36
See infra notes 194–234 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision on the issue class in a disparate impact employment discrimination case).
37
See infra notes 235–255 and accompanying text (examining Wal-Mart from the perspective of
Rule 23(c)(4)).
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some of the implications of using the issue class in employment cases, and situates the Article in the context of the broader academic scholarship.38
In sum, Wal-Mart presents an enormous challenge for employment discrimination plaintiffs. This Article attempts to identify the best way for workplace litigants to pursue systemic claims after Wal-Mart, and explains—for the
first time—how issue class certification can be used to navigate around the
Supreme Court’s recent decision. This Article seeks to fill the current void in
the academic literature on Rule 23(c)(4), and attempts to start a dialogue on
how the issue class can be used as an effective procedural tool for employment
discrimination plaintiffs post Wal-Mart. The issue class—although perhaps
somewhat underutilized and misunderstood—is simply the best available solution to the problem facing workplace claimants.
I. THE WAL-MART DECISION
A. The Supreme Court Decision
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court considered a case brought by one and a
half million current and former female employees of the company who alleged
discrimination on the basis of pay. 39 The case was “one of the most expansive
class actions ever,” and was brought against the largest private employer in the
United States. 40
The plaintiffs maintained that Wal-Mart’s policy of allowing local managers to make pay and promotion decisions discriminated on the basis of sex
and resulted in a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 41 The
workers did not maintain that there was any formal corporate policy of discrimination against females. 42 Instead, they argued that the discretion afforded
to local supervisors was being used to favor male employees. 43 According to
the plaintiffs, then, this policy resulted in an unlawful disparate impact under
Title VII, as it had an adverse effect on the basis of sex. 44 And, because WalMart was aware of this disparate impact yet did nothing, the plaintiffs contended that the company should further be held responsible for intentional discrimination under the statute.45 The plaintiffs did not limit their claim to certain
stores or regions, arguing instead that all women working at Wal-Mart were

38

See infra notes 256–286 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the
issue class).
39
131 S. Ct. at 2547.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 2548.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See id.
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affected. 46 In support of these allegations, they introduced both anecdotal and
statistical evidence demonstrating Wal-Mart’s discriminatory practices. 47 The
Court provided a succinct summary of the workers’ claims:
The basic theory of the[] case is that a strong and uniform ‘corporate
culture’ permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decision making of each one of Wal-Mart’s
thousands of managers—thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice. Respondents therefore wish to litigate the Title VII claims of all female employees at Wal-Mart’s stores in a nationwide class action. 48
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California certified
the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 49 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the case to determine whether the lower court had properly applied the class
action standards. 50
In analyzing the case, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court,
looked to whether the plaintiff had properly satisfied the four requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation.51 In considering these factors, the Court focused primarily on the commonality requirement.52 This element requires that
the plaintiff demonstrate “questions of law or fact common to the class.”53
Emphasizing the large size of the putative class, the Court looked for “some
glue” to hold the “millions of employment decisions” in the case together.54
The Court was unable to find a common thread sufficient to warrant class
treatment under Rule 23. The Court found no “general policy of discrimination” at the company and instead viewed the case as involving individual decision makers being responsible for the discrimination.55 The Court also found
no fault in Wal-Mart’s decision to permit local managers to exercise discretion
over pay and promotion determinations.56 This type of approach is “a very
46

Id.
Id. at 2549.
48
Id. at 2548.
49
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2541; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 187 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 603 F.3d 571 (en
banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
50
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari).
51
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550.
52
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (setting forth the four requirements that must be satisfied for a class
to proceed); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (“The crux of this case is commonality . . . .”).
53
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–51 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)).
54
Id. at 2552.
55
See id. at 2553–56 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).
56
Id. at 2554.
47

128

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 56:121

common and presumptively reasonable way of doing business.” 57 The Court
did not say that permitting such discretion could never be discriminatory, but
that here the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that “a common mode of exercising discretion . . . pervades the entire company.” 58
The Court also concluded that the statistical and anecdotal evidence of the
putative class was insufficient. 59 Regardless of whether the statistics presented
demonstrated some type of pay disparity, they still failed to establish the commonality necessary to certify the class.60 Similarly, the Court found too few
examples of specific discrimination to warrant any conclusion that there was a
generalized practice of discrimination at Wal-Mart.61 The Court thus concluded
that the class members “held a multitude of different jobs, at different levels of
Wal-Mart’s hierarchy,” across thousands of stores and every state, with numerous policies and different supervisors. 62 Thus, the Court stated that the class
members “have little in common but their sex and this lawsuit,” and, accordingly, the Court denied class certification. 63
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by three other justices, dissented
from the majority opinion. 64 The dissent argued that the plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient commonality to certify the class, noting that the company’s
pay practices “operate uniformly across stores.”65 The dissent also maintained
that there was a common culture at Wal-Mart consisting of “frequent meetings
to reinforce the common way of thinking, regular transfers of managers between stores to ensure uniformity [and] monitoring of stores on a close and
constant basis.” 66 This evidence, along with the statistical and anecdotal offerings, led the dissent to believe “that gender bias suffused Wal-Mart’s company
culture.” 67 Thus, the dissent strongly disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
that there was no commonality in the plaintiffs’ claims, and further disagreed
with the majority’s decision not to certify the class. 68

57

Id.
See id. at 2554–55.
59
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
60
Id. at 2555–56.
61
Id. at 2556.
62
Id. at 2557 (quoting Dukes, 603 F.3d at 652 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)).
63
Id. The Court’s discussion of monetary relief, which is beyond the scope of this Article, is
omitted here.
64
Id. at 2561–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65
Id. at 2563. Justice Ginsburg noted that “Wal-Mart’s delegation of discretion over pay and
promotions is a policy uniform throughout all stores. The very nature of discretion is that people will
exercise it in various ways.” Id. at 2567.
66
Id. at 2563 (internal quotations omitted).
67
Id.
68
See id. at 2563–65.
58
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B. Academic Response to Wal-Mart
The academic response to Wal-Mart was largely uniform. Scholars have
widely criticized the decision as undermining the civil rights protections of
workers across the country. 69 For example, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
maintains that following Wal-Mart, “it will be very difficult for employment
discrimination claims to be litigated as a class action.”70 Similarly, two other
scholars have argued that the Court’s decision “may undercut not only class
actions, but also the procedurally distinct ‘collective actions’ that let masses of
workers sue for unpaid wages.” 71
The literature criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart continues to grow. 72 These scholars’ arguments are very well founded. It is now
time to move past this debate, however, and examine how employment discrimination plaintiffs pursuing class claims can respond to the Supreme
69

See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart
v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 77–97 (2011)
(reading cases to interpret the Supreme Court’s conservative majority’s desire to protect big businesses and limit remedies for consumers and employees); Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 593 (2012) (“The Wal-Mart ruling—although procedural—will have a disproportionate impact on particular substantive areas of the law, even within civil
rights litigation.”); Robert H. Klonoff, Reflections on the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 533, 536–37 (2012) (concluding that Wal-Mart raises the burden for plaintiffs seeking class certification by requiring the common question be “essentially dispositive” and by giving defendants new
methods to challenge certification); Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 553 (2012) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561) (“Without the
possibility of what that opinion derisively referred to as ‘Trial by Formula,’ it will be difficult to certify many class actions.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes
v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 44–45 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2011/18/LRColl2011n18Malveaux.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H648-LK3J
(concluding that the majority’s opinion will make it more difficult for employees relying on the theory
of excessive subjectivity as a discriminatory policy to act collectively); Brian R. Martinotti, Complex
Litigation in New Jersey and Federal Courts: An Overview of the Current State of Affairs and a
Glimpse of What Lies Ahead, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 564–65 (2012) (stating that Wal-Mart makes
certification more difficult for plaintiffs by requiring district judges to conduct a “rigorous analysis, at
times overlapping with the merits of the plaintiffs’ underlying claims”); Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
HARV. L. REV. 78, 148–54 (2011) (“These Wal-Mart rulings crafted new impediments to the congressional charter authorizing private enforcement of Title VII as well as to Rule 23’s recognition of different kinds of relatedness . . . as a predicate for aggregation under judicial supervision.”); Eric
Schnapper, Review of Labor and Employment Law Decisions from the United States Supreme Court’s
2010–2011 Term, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 329, 329–41 (2012) (outlining the different ways WalMart will require more of plaintiffs seeking to certify employment discrimination class actions); Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36 (“The biggest
losers in AT&T Mobility and Wal-Mart were not the class members, who deserved to lose on their
particular claims, but consumers and employees who might wish to bring class actions in the future.”).
70
Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 375, 380 (2011).
71
Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage
Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 526 (2012).
72
See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.

130

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 56:121

Court’s decision. It is thus time to begin a dialogue not on the efficacy of WalMart, but rather on how plaintiffs can best pursue their claims in light of this
decision. This Article engages that discussion with an analysis of the best remaining tool for pursuing class action claims in the workplace context—the
issue class.
II. THE WAY FORWARD: ISSUE CLASS CERTIFICATION
In its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court
declined to certify a class of one and a half million current and former female
employees of Wal-Mart. 73 Taking the academic commentary on Wal-Mart as
true, the decision creates a sizeable hurdle for victims of employment discrimination. 74 The case substantially raises the bar for plaintiffs hoping to litigate
systemic claims of discrimination.75 In the employment discrimination context,
class actions are particularly important, as many individual claims can be for
small amounts not worthy of pursuit. 76 And, class actions can quickly get the
attention of employers everywhere and encourage them to adopt nondiscriminatory policies.77 These types of claims also punish those employers
that do discriminate, and compensate all victims of the company’s unlawful
behavior. 78
This Article thus adopts the two-part approach taken by so many others to
date: (1) class actions are good for enforcing civil rights law; and (2) the WalMart decision has made it more difficult to pursue class actions and thus undermines the rights of workers everywhere. 79 The decision’s reasoning may not be
definitive enough to know the extent to which the case will redefine the law—at
least not without taking a step back to see how the lower courts ultimately interpret the decision. Nonetheless, the commentators are largely correct that WalMart represents a broad strike against workers, and will undoubtedly make it
more difficult for them to litigate class claims. Thus, although it may be fair to

73

131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011).
See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the academic reaction to Wal-Mart).
75
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, TRIAL, Nov. 2011, at 54, 56 (stating that although Wal-Mart may be read as narrowly dealing with large class actions, class actions
will be more difficult to bring in the future).
76
See Pam Jenoff, As Equal as Others? Rethinking Access to Discrimination Law, 81 U. CIN. L.
REV. 85, 97 (2012) (“[J]udgments in employment discrimination lawsuits are relatively modest compared to other areas of litigation.”).
77
See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 887 (2001) (“[C]lass actions received increasing
attention from policy-makers and the media.”).
78
See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 7, at 1344 (discussing the role of class actions in employment
discrimination cases).
79
See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
74
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quibble with some of the current scholarship at the margins, the main thrust of
the arguments against Wal-Mart is both sound and well supported.
This Article does not seek to engage in the debate over Wal-Mart’s impact, as this is well-traveled ground. Instead, it offers one creative way to utilize the class action provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to help
negate the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision: issue class certification.
First, Section A of this Part addresses traditional class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and Rule 23(b). 80 Section B then discusses
what issue class certification is, how it can be applied to employment discrimination cases, and the potential benefit of using this procedural mechanism. 81
Then, Section C walks through how this procedural tool was effectively used
in a civil rights case following the Wal-Mart decision, in an opinion authored
by Judge Posner. 82 Finally, Section D discusses how the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart
could have effectively used this mechanism to pursue their claims. 83
At the outset, it is important to make clear that issue class certification is
not the only way to help circumvent the Wal-Mart decision. Indeed, previous
scholarship has outlined other effective ways of pursuing systemic discrimination claims even in light of the Supreme Court’s heightened view of “commonality” under the Rules. 84 And, this Article attempts to formulate one particularly useful way for plaintiffs to pursue class action claims after Wal-Mart.
It therefore attempts to begin a dialogue on the techniques that civil rights litigants can utilize to pursue collective actions. Ideally, it will inspire others to
offer similar suggestions and engage this debate.
A. Rule 23 and the Class Action
The intricacies of the Federal Rules and class actions are well known. A
brief review of the Rules, however, helps provide some context to the usefulness
of the issue class. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outlines how
class actions may be certified. 85 To proceed, a class must satisfy all of the provisions of Rule 23(a) and one of the categories set forth in Rule 23(b). 86 The vast
majority of systemic claims are analyzed under these two Rules.87 Rule 23(a)
sets forth the well-known requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality,
80

See infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97–193 and accompanying text.
82
See infra notes 194–234 and accompanying text.
83
See infra notes 235–255 and accompanying text.
84
See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 7, at 1352–78 (outlining the governmental, procedural, and damages responses to the Supreme Court’s decision).
85
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
86
See Malveaux, supra note 69, at 35 (“For a case to be certified as a class action, all of the Rule
23(a) provisions and one of the Rule 23(b) provisions must be met.”).
87
See id.
81
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and adequacy of representation that must be satisfied for a class to proceed.88
Rule 23(b) offers three different ways of certifying a class action.89
A Rule 23(b)(1) class is permitted where individual litigation may create
“inconsistent or varying adjudications” or judgments that “would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair . . . their interests.” 90 A subsection 23(b)(2)
class action is one where injunctive relief would be primarily appropriate. 91
And a Rule 23(b)(3) class is sought where “questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate” and where the “class action is superior to other
available methods” of adjudication.92
Notably, 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class certification permits mandatory class
cases, whereas Rule 23(b)(3) allows “opt-out class actions.”93 The opt-out cases of Rule 23(b)(3) have been the most challenging for the courts, as they have
often struggled to apply this provision. 94 These challenges may stem from the
fact that the majority of systemic cases seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
and that these claims “usually . . . [involve] a high proportion of monetary
damages.” 95 In these types of conventional class cases, the whole case is certified as a single action by the court. 96
B. The Issue Class
A separate procedural provision—added in 1966 as an amendment to the
Federal Rules—can also be used to litigate specific issues in a case.97 Although
traditional claims brought under Rule 23(b) involve “an all-or-nothing decision
to aggregate individual cases,” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) allows
litigants to resolve specific issues in a case on a class-wide basis. 98 Or, as is
more commonly known, this provision provides for “issue class” certification.
According to the Rule, an issue class may proceed as follows:

88

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
Id. 23(b).
90
Id. 23(b)(1).
91
Id. 23(b)(2).
92
Id. 23(b)(3).
93
See Jenna G. Farleigh, Note, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Issue Class Certification, 64
VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1594 (2011) (noting that many courts have “largely merged” Rules 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2), and that cases often proceed under both provisions).
94
See id. at 1594–95.
95
See id.
96
Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 264. The court does not consider
“whether there are issues in the case that cannot be resolved collectively.” Id.
97
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790.
98
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); Romberg, supra note 96, at 251.
89
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Particular Issues. When appropriate, an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.99
This “little-heralded” Rule is ambiguous, and does not explain when an
issue class is appropriate. 100 Nevertheless, over time a substantial amount of
litigation and scholarship has helped define the issue class. It is typically used
where there are common issues present in the case that would apply to the entire class, even where other questions will need to be resolved individually in
specific cases. 101 Thus, it is not uncommon for cases to proceed collectively on
common questions under Rule 23(c)(4), while other issues are resolved independently, such as “questions of reliance[] [and] damages.” 102 Courts have
even applied this Rule in instances where there is only a single issue common
to the entire class. 103
In proceeding as a Rule 23(c)(4) class, the plaintiffs must quickly—and
precisely—identify the issue(s) that deserve common treatment.104 This means
that the plaintiffs must articulate precisely “what issues of fact or law they believe can and should be resolved collectively” and identify “what issues must
be resolved individually.” 105 The procedural rules require that, “[a]t an early
practicable time,” the court “determine by order whether to certify the action
as a class action.” 106 Thus, the plaintiffs should move to certify the issue class
as soon as possible in the case. 107 Raising the issue early on can be a doubleedged sword, however, as discovery and other proceedings in the matter may
require that the specific issue certified be modified or refined as the case proceeds. 108
In certifying a case under Rule 23(c)(4), the court must still determine
that the other provisions of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied. 109 Thus, the issue
99
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). See generally Jenna C. Smith, Comment,“Carving at the Joints”:
Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class Actions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2013) (discussing
issue class certification).
100
See Romberg, supra note 96, at 251.
101
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790.
102
Id.
103
See Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 447
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971) (utilizing the issue class where only a single common issue was present); St.
Augustine High Sch. v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 270 F. Supp. 767, 774 n.8 (E.D. La.
1967), aff’d, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968) (same).
104
See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 96, at 268 (“The trial court should require the plaintiffs to state,
quite specifically, the definition of their proposed class.”).
105
Id. at 269.
106
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
107
See Romberg, supra note 96, at 268.
108
See id.
109
See Michael J. Wylie, Comment, In the Ongoing Debate Between the Expansive and Limited
Interpretations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A), Advantage Expansivists!, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 352
(2007) (noting that commentators “agree that the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must be satisfied in
order for a class to be certified as to a claim or issue”).
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must share numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation for a class to proceed. 110 There is substantial debate, however, as to
whether courts can certify an issue class when the plaintiffs have not satisfied
the predominance element of Rule 23(b)(3).111 As already discussed, where the
plaintiffs seek monetary relief in the case, they must typically satisfy this element of Rule 23(b)(3). 112 This means that, in the majority of class action cases,
the plaintiffs will have to show that “questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over” other questions. 113 Thus, although it is clear that
plaintiffs seeking issue class certification must establish the four components
of Rule 23(a), there is less certainty as to what they must establish under Rule
23(b). 114 Moreover, courts have issued varying opinions in this regard. 115
For the most part, appellate courts have agreed that the issue class can
proceed under Rule 23(c)(4) even where the predominance requirement of
Rule 23(b) has not been satisfied. 116 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all followed this more permissive approach. 117 The Fifth Circuit has been more restrictive, however, and initially
held that predominance was required for issue class certification.118 The court’s
more recent decisions have relaxed this approach, 119 leading some commentators to argue that the appellate courts are “unanimous in holding that Rule
23(c)(4) authorizes certification of issue classes” even where predominance is
absent. 120 Others have disagreed with this conclusion. 121 The scholarship has
110

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
See Wylie, supra note 109, at 353–54.
112
See id. at 352.
113
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
114
See id.
115
See Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal, 62 DEPAUL L.
REV. 733, 739–40 (2013) (setting forth the treatment of Rule 23(c)(4) by the appellate courts).
116
See id. at 739 (discussing the opinion of the Seventh Circuit); Wylie, supra note 109, at 358–
63 (discussing the opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuits).
117
See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338; In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir.
2006); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Gunnells v.
Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 438–45 (4th Cir. 2003) (reasoning in dicta that an issue class
may proceed without first satisfying the predominance requirement imposed by Rule 23(b)(3)).
118
See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “[a] district court cannot manufacture predominance through the nimble use of [Rule 23](c)(4)”).
119
See In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 369 n.13 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Rule 23(c)(4) explicitly recognizes the flexibility that courts need in class certification by allowing certification with respect
to particular issues and division of the class into subclasses.”); Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC,
186 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that an issue class satisfied the predominance requirement
because “the issues to be tried commonly . . . were significant in relation to the individual issues”
unique to each plaintiff).
120
See Patricia Bronte et al., “Carving at the Joint”: The Precise Function of Rule 23(c)(4), 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 745, 745–46 (2013). Bronte and her co-authors argue that after the Fifth Circuit’s
more recent decisions, the “circuit split . . . has all but vanished.” Id. (internal quotation marks omit111
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been mixed on the question of whether an issue class should be permitted
where the requirements of Rule 23(b) have not been satisfied.
Irrespective of the outcome of the predominance issue, however, issue
class certification offers great promise as a way for employment discrimination
plaintiffs to pursue systemic claims even after Wal-Mart. 122 Using Rule
23(c)(4) offers numerous benefits that should make issue certification appealing to both the litigants and the courts. Two such benefits jump immediately to
mind—efficiency and flexibility.
Using the issue class to certify specific questions in a case helps courts
handle complex matters more efficiently. 123 Where a particular question can be
resolved as a class, that issue only needs to be answered a single time, forgoing
the need for subsequent litigation.124 This will save an abundance of time and
resources for the parties, as the rest of the litigation can proceed without the
need to revisit the common issue in the case. The issue class thus offers “a
happy medium between individual cases and a global class action.”125 By resolving a question only once across a swath of cases, then, the issue class helps
to streamline the litigation and bring efficiency to the entire judicial process.126
Additionally, issue class certification provides the trial courts with an
immense amount of flexibility when addressing systemic claims.127 As all class
claims are different, Rule 23(c)(4) allows the judge to peel off specific com-

ted). For an example from the recent case law, see In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 811 (5th
Cir. 2014) (holding that class certification was proper under Rule 23(b)(3)).
121
Compare Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709,
763 (2003) (“Rule 23(c)(4)(A) in its current form cannot authorize expansive issue class actions. Interpreting the provision to do so would require an untenably strained reading of its text, impermissibly
rewriting Rule 23 by judicial fiat.”), with Wylie, supra note 109, at 372 (“Rule 23(c)(4)(A) in its current form should be interpreted expansively to authorize issue class actions. . . . [C]ourts should not
adopt the limited interpretation because it is on especially shaky grounds given the distortion of the
language and structure of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) required to facilitate an interpretation that ultimately renders the provision a redundant expression of what the predominance requirement . . . already implies.”). See generally Perry, supra note 115 (arguing that “issue certification is properly limited to
bifurcating liability from remedies, and does not allow the certification (or exclusion) of discrete
claim elements and defenses”).
122
This paper does not address the issue of whether predominance is needed to certify an issue
class. Instead, it assumes the position taken by the majority of courts on the issue that a Rule 23(c)(4)
class can proceed irrespective of whether Rule 23(b)(3) has been satisfied. See supra note 117 and
accompanying text. Although this approach seems to carry the day in the appellate courts, the issue
will not ultimately be resolved until the Supreme Court addresses the matter.
123
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790; Romberg, supra note 96, at 299.
124
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790 (“[T]he theory of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) is that the
advantages and economies of adjudicating issues that are common to the entire class on a representative basis may be secured . . . .”).
125
Romberg, supra note 96, at 299.
126
See id. (“The efficiency arises from collective resolution of the issues common to the class
. . . .”).
127
See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790.
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mon questions in the case and resolve other issues individually. 128 Further,
plaintiffs can use issue certification at any stage of the litigation. 129 This type
of flexibility permits a class case “to be adjudicated that otherwise might have
to be dismissed or reduced to a nonrepresentative proceeding because it appears to be unmanageable.” 130 Thus the issue class provides essential flexibility and simplification to otherwise difficult and complex systemic litigation.
The efficiencies and flexibility that Rule 23(c)(4) provides are particularly
fitting in the employment discrimination context.131 Again, the issue class is
particularly appropriate where there are common facts among the litigants but
individual differences as to the degree of harm that has been suffered. Systemic
employment discrimination claims frequently involve this exact scenario,
providing a common set of facts that give rise to the company’s wrongdoing.132
Further, the employer’s discrimination often impacts plaintiffs to varying degrees, both financially and emotionally. 133 Thus, the common set of facts combined with the varying level of harm make the issue class a particularly useful
tool for employment discrimination litigants.
The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart were unable to certify their claim as a traditional class action under Rule 23(b) because of a lack of commonality across
plaintiffs and stores. 134 Yet, despite the differences among the claims, there
were still common issues in the case. 135 Issue class certification could thus
have provided a useful and efficient way of analyzing that particular litigation.
Section D of this Part sets forth in detail how Rule 23(c)(4) might have been
used to benefit the Wal-Mart litigation. 136 Beyond the Wal-Mart example,
128

See id. (“[S]ubdivision (c)(4) is designed to give the court additional flexibility in handling
class actions . . . .”).
129
See id. (“Several courts thus have noted at the certification stage that allegations about potential conflicts among class members or manageability concerns may be handled later in the litigation by
utilizing Rule 23(c)(4).”).
130
Id.
131
The issue class is not appropriate in all mass litigation. See Romberg, supra note 96, at 299
(“For a controversy with little in the way of severable common issues, certification may well not be
worth the bother—individual lawsuits will be superior. For a controversy that is entirely composed of
common issues, a global class action will be superior.”). For example, where it is difficult to identify
an issue that can be easily separated out in the litigation, issue certification would not be proper. See
id. Similarly, where numerous common questions exist across plaintiffs, a traditional class action—
rather than an issue class—should be pursued. See id. Nonetheless, issue certification will often be
superior for “those downstream cases in which there is a significant common nucleus of operative
facts concerning the propriety of the defendant’s conduct . . . yet widespread variation in how or if
that conduct . . . has harmed class members.” Id. at 299–300.
132
See infra notes 137–162 and accompanying text (outlining the common issues in Title VII
litigation).
133
See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text (outlining the differences among discrimination claims).
134
See 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
135
See id. at 2547–48.
136
See infra notes 235–255 and accompanying text.
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however, the issue class is promising for all workplace plaintiffs pursuing systemic claims. As Wal-Mart shows, these cases are ripe for issue class certification, as they frequently offer both a common set of facts to all plaintiffs and
individual variances among specific plaintiffs.
The common issues in employment proceedings abound, as do the individual differences among litigants. A survey of the case law and literature in this
area reveals many common factors among workplace claims. The most common
similarities in Title VII litigation can be broken down into three areas: (1) common companywide policies; (2) common personnel; and (3) common practices.
1. Corporate Policies
It is very common for a corporation to adopt formal, company-wide policies. Specifically, companies frequently adopt a variety of policies related to a
worker’s employment. 137 These polices are often introduced to employees as
part of their orientation process and set out in an employee handbook. 138 Employers may announce and adopt other policies over the course of an individual’s
employment. 139 These policies vary in scope and can range from the minutia of a
worker’s employment to the major components of an individual’s job.140
For example, formal company policies often include such issues as vacation and leave rules, pay and promotion policies, discipline guidelines, benefit

137

See, e.g., Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1305 (2008) (“Formal policies can be important evidence in discrimination cases . . . .”); Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How
the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual Harassment Law Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 143 (2008) (noting that “[e]mpirical studies have found that
sexual harassment policies proliferated in the wake of” Supreme Court case law); Sharon RabinMargalioth, Love at Work, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 237, 238 (2006) (noting that “employers
have instituted a variety of rules and policies that regulate the extent to which employees are allowed
to personally interact with one another”); Joshua C. Polster, Note, Workplace Grievance Procedures:
Signaling Fairness but Escalating Commitment, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 638, 638 (2011) (“Over the last
fifty years, nonunion employers have increasingly adopted formal grievance procedures, which allow
employees to challenge a company decision or policy and appeal manager adjudications of the challenge.”).
138
See Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 326, 334–35 (1993) (“Employee handbooks are a common source of an implied contract
right to job security. The transformation of employee handbooks from gratuitous expressions of employer policy to enforceable legal obligations provides a vivid illustration of the declining adherence
to the employment-at-will rule.”); John Giovannone, Note, In the Wake of Hurricane Asmus: A Lost
Opportunity in Our Struggle with Employment Handbooks, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1687, 1694 (2004)
(“The employee handbook is arguably the most established and important illustration of the corporate
policy exception to at-will employment.”).
139
See Giovannone, supra note 138, at 1697–98 (explaining that some employers change company policies by issuing modified or amended employee handbooks).
140
See Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 137, at 246–51 (criticizing employers’ overly-broad policies
that forbid consensual relationships between employees).
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arrangements, operating hours and rules, and grievance procedures.141 Policies
can also touch on discrimination in the workplace, and employers frequently
adopt anti-harassment and anti-discrimination procedures that inform employees what to do if they believe that they have been subject to illegal workplace
conduct. 142 It is not uncommon for workplace policies to also include information on health and safety, and to inform employees how to act in the context
of a dangerous situation. 143 Key for purposes of this discussion is that an employment policy (1) can affect the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment and (2) can impact workers across the entire company.
Because employer policies are often formal and uniform across a business, they frequently present a common set of facts for numerous plaintiffs. As
these policies are so widespread in the workplace, they also give rise to a
common issue that could be certified under Rule 23(c)(4). The courts and litigants could thus save enormous judicial resources by resolving any workplace
claims that touch on a common policy a single time, while litigating the remaining issues in the case separately. For example, a court could examine
whether an employer’s policy on healthcare discriminates against a particular
religious group, or whether a business’s pay platform negatively affects women. By resolving these questions only once in a case through Rule 23(c)(4),
each individual plaintiff would not have to relitigate the issues.
Issue class certification can be particularly helpful in disparate impact
cases. In a disparate impact case, an employer has violated Title VII by adopting an employment policy that is facially neutral, but nonetheless has a discriminatory impact on workers for which there is no business justification. 144
The Supreme Court first recognized a claim for disparate impact in 1971.145
Congress subsequently codified this cause of action in Title VII as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 146 A plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim must
set forth the policy in question that gives rise to the adverse effect. 147 For ex141

See Richard Harrison Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 196 (“An employee handbook typically informs the employee about
grievance and termination procedures, severance pay, insurance, vacation pay, and general operating
rules.”).
142
See Ho, supra note 137, at 142 (noting the rise in sexual harassment policies following the
Supreme Court rulings on the issue).
143
See generally Rowena M. Durán, Note, The Employer’s Dilemma: The Implications of Occupational Safety and Health in the Arbitral Process—Conflicting Contractual and Statutory Commands, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067 (1983) (discussing various employer safety and health policies
and issues).
144
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012) (setting forth the statutory prohibition for disparate impact).
145
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
146
See Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?,
90 B.U. L. REV. 2181, 2185–95 (2010) (discussing the history of disparate impact and its codification
into law).
147
See id. at 2194.
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ample, an employer might have a policy requiring that its employees have a
high school diploma. Given the educational opportunities available to certain
minority groups in particular areas of the country, such a policy could have a
disparate impact on those groups. This was the central question in the 1971
case Griggs v. Duke Power Co., in which the Supreme Court held that an employer’s policy requiring that employees hold a high school diploma and take
an IQ test violated the disparate impact provisions of Title VII. 148
Moreover, because disparate impact claims typically affect large numbers
of workers, issue class certification would be particularly appropriate for these
claims. 149 Disparate impact claims involve a common policy that affects numerous employees in the workplace. Any questions as to that policy could be
certified for a single resolution. Thus, in Griggs, the question of whether a diploma requirement had a statistical disparate impact on a protected group
could have been certified for review.150 Rule 23(c)(4) could have also been
used to determine whether the employer had a business necessity for adopting
the policy, and whether there were alternative policies available that would
have served the employer’s business goals yet had less of a discriminatory impact on the workforce. 151
Company policies, then, provide an area of enormous potential for issue
class certification in the employment discrimination context. As these policies
involve a similar set of facts among numerous workers, cases that implicate
corporate rules may be particularly appropriate for Rule 23(c)(4) review. Disparate impact claims, which inherently involve corporate policy, are thus one
subset of workplace litigation that would benefit greatly from the use of the
issue class. 152
2. Common Personnel
Workplaces, by their very nature, involve the same managers, presidents,
and executive officers. Many employees—sometimes hundreds or thousands—
will thus end up sharing a particular boss at the same company. The decisions
of these managers or supervisors will often end up impacting an entire class of
workers. For example, a supervisor could treat women in a negative way, or
148

See 401 U.S. at 432.
See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 911, 968 (2005) (noting that “disparate impact is conceived of as class-based litigation,
typically pursued either in formal class actions or by the EEOC in pattern and practice cases”).
150
See 401 U.S. at 427–28 (noting that the company policy of requiring a high school education
applied to all employees).
151
See id. at 431–36 (noting that the diploma requirement was not “a reasonable measure of job
performance”).
152
See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment:
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95 (2006) (discussing the role of policies in disparate impact law).
149
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may only allow white employees to be promoted within the company.153 Similarly, the company president may make a discriminatory comment or remark at
a meeting in front of the entire workforce. 154 Or, a regional manager might
send out an email that disparages a particular group.155
Because the “players” in employment discrimination cases tend to be the
same at a particular company, there may often be similar issues among plaintiffs when these same “players” are involved. Rather than resolving these issues multiple times, Rule 23(c)(4) would allow the court to answer questions
involving common personnel once. Thus, the court could address on a classwide basis whether a manager’s email was discriminatory, whether the president’s comments were disparaging, or whether a particular supervisor held a
negative animus towards women.
In addition, it is also common for there to be more technical questions in
employment cases, including whether the statutory minimum for employees
has been satisfied, or whether the workforce is large enough to permit the maximum award of compensatory and punitive damages. 156 Or, there might be a
question as to whether a particular individual at the company satisfies the statutory definition of being a “supervisor,” which could have important ramifications in particular workplace cases.157 Similarly, it is not uncommon for a court
to address the question of whether or not workers are employees or independent contractors under a particular statute.158 A court could resolve these questions, which all involve issues pertaining to common personnel, a single time
pursuant to issue class certification. A single jury could thus determine the size
of a particular workforce, whether certain workers are truly employees, and
which workers constitute management personnel. Although the individual issues could vary significantly in each case, courts can address these common
questions to help streamline the broader litigation.

153

See, e.g., Deborah P. Kelly, Evidence Issues and Jury Instructions in Harassment Cases, in
EVIDENCE ISSUES AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN EMPLOYMENT CASES 109, 111–15 (Am. L. Inst.-Am.
Bar. Ass’n. ed., 2007) (discussing cases involving improper remarks by supervisors).
154
See, e.g., id. at 112–14 (discussing cases involving discrimination by company presidents).
155
See generally Meir S. Hornung, Note, Think Before You Type: A Look at Email Privacy in the
Workplace, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 115 (2005) (addressing the potential liability of employers for discriminatory emails).
156
See Senn, supra note 24, at 193–97 (discussing damages provisions of federal employment
discrimination statutes); Jacqueline Louise Williams, Note, The Flimsy Yardstick: How Many Employees Does It Take to Defeat a Title VII Discrimination Claim?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 232–36
(1996) (addressing issues in coverage under Title VII).
157
See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443–52 (2013) (addressing the standard for
supervisory liability).
158
See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–51 (2003) (discussing
who is an “employee” under the terms of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII).
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3. Common Practices
Beyond similar policies and personnel, workplaces often involve common
practices. 159 These practices tend to be more informal in nature, and are often
more of an issue of corporate culture than written policy. 160 For example, it
may simply be the particular practice at a business to consider a worker for
partnership after eight years of practice. Or, it may be unspoken precedent that
an employee who is late to work more than five times is automatically terminated. Or, it may be the practice of workers not to use their accrued vacation
time or sick leave because it is frowned upon at the company.
These types of practices may have a discriminatory effect on certain
groups. 161 The above vacation time example could negatively impact women
more than men, if it could be established that this group has a greater need to
use time off for family responsibilities.162 Regardless of the alleged discriminatory practice, however, Rule 23(c)(4) offers a potential benefit in this area. The
question of whether a particular practice even exists at a company—and if that
practice does exist, whether it has a discriminatory impact—could be resolved
class-wide without the need for individual litigation.
4. Individual Variances
Employment discrimination claims offer numerous similarities and often
share common personnel, policies and practices. 163 Nonetheless, each workplace claim also tends to be unique, as individual employees differ in many
respects.
The most notable difference among discrimination claims is the damages
that individual workers can claim. 164 Even where workplace claims arise from
the same set of facts, the relief available to plaintiffs will vary tremendously

159

See Fineman, supra note 21, at 353.
See id. (“Notwithstanding the legalities, employers established their own, often informal, rules
and practices in the absence of comprehensive state regulation. For example, beginning in the late
19th century many American employers began instituting hierarchical job ladders, specific job classification systems, seniority systems, and employee retention policies . . . .”); cf. Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) (“In the context of Title VII, the contract of employment may be
written or oral, formal or informal . . . .”).
161
See Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 699, 738 (1986).
162
See id. (“[T]he courts have indicated that the absence of an adequate leave policy could violate
Title VII because of its disproportionate impact on women. While women would be affected by the
absence of a general disability leave policy to the same extent as men, women would still bear the
additional burden of pregnancy disability.”).
163
See supra notes 137–162 and accompanying text.
164
See Senn, supra note 24, at 193–97 (discussing the different types of damages available to
plaintiffs under federal discrimination laws).
160
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across workers. 165 This is true for two reasons. First, the financial ramifications
that each employee suffers as a result of the discrimination can be different.
This is because employees often have different rates of pay and different career
paths. 166 The specific amount of damages each employee experiences will
therefore have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 167
Second, compensatory damages also vary substantially across a workforce. 168 In employment discrimination cases, compensatory damages are typically comprised of emotional harm and psychological suffering that results
from an employer’s discrimination.169 These types of damages are, by their
very nature, individualized. 170 The fact-finder will thus have to make a casespecific determination as to the amount of harm each individual suffered by
evaluating that particular employee’s claim. 171
Beyond the differences in financial and psychological harm, other variances in employment discrimination cases exist. For example, in a disability
discrimination case, plaintiffs may allege that the employer has a policy of failing to reasonably accommodate individual workers. 172 Such a policy could
violate federal law across a class of employees. 173 Yet, the fact finder would
need to make an individual determination as to what accommodation would be
appropriate for each specific worker. 174 Thus, although financial and psycho165
See Daniel F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 305, 305–06 (“The individualized issues of proof and liability raised by
the availability of damages may destroy the commonality necessary to maintain a class action under
Rule 23(b)(3) and may render other means of adjudication superior to a class action within the meaning of the Rule.”).
166
See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest
for Equal Pay, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 270 (2012) (“Under Title VII, prevailing plaintiffs may
recover the amount of the pay disparity plus compensatory and punitive damages . . . .”).
167
See Patrick O. Gudridge, Title VII Arbitration, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 209, 238–39
(1995) (discussing the case-specific nature of damages in employment discrimination litigation).
168
See Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 416–17 (5th Cir. 1998).
169
See Anna Ku, Note, “You’re Fired!” Determining Whether a Wrongly Terminated Employee
Who Has Been Reinstated with Back Pay Has an Actionable Title VII Retaliation Claim, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1663, 1692 (2007) (“The Civil Rights Act also specifically mentions types of damages
for emotional harm (emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of
life) as forms of compensatory damage.”).
170
See Allison, 151 F.3d at 416–17 (discussing the individualized nature of compensatory damages in Title VII litigation).
171
See id.
172
See generally Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact,
and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861 (2006) (discussing the use of the class action mechanism under
the Americans with Disabilities Act).
173
See id.at 864 (explaining that stereotypes about a class of individuals sometimes lead to discrimination against the entire class).
174
See id.at 883 (“Courts have denied certification to five classes containing individuals with a
range of disabilities, and their respective denials were predicated on the notion that the remedies
granted, if any, were based on individualized inquiry into disability and the accommodation needed,
and thus lacked typicality.”).
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logical harm are the two most common variances in employment cases, other
differences exist based upon the facts of an individual’s case.
As demonstrated, employment discrimination cases often have much in
common. Systemic discrimination claims frequently involve common policies,
practices, and personnel, though other similarities are often also present. At the
same time, workplace claims are almost universally different because the damages available to individual workers vary greatly. These damages depend heavily on each worker’s particular position and the amount of pain and suffering
each employee experiences. 175
Workplace claims are therefore particularly appropriate for certification
under Rule 23(c)(4). Given that these claims will inherently vary across a
class, they will not be suitable for traditional class treatment under Rule 23(b),
as Wal-Mart demonstrates. And, as these systemic cases will often arise from
the same set of facts and involve the same polices, practices, and personnel,
there will often be overlapping issues that could be peeled off and certified as
an issue class. Courts can therefore streamline litigation by resolving these
common issues on a class basis under Rule 23(c)(4).
5. The Sexual Harassment Example
Issue class certification’s value in employment cases is best seen through
an example: sexual harassment. Hostile work environment cases are one of the
most frequently filed claims under Title VII.176 These claims allege that hostility on the basis of sex permeates the working environment. 177 Common evidence in these cases often involves workers’ sexual jokes, touching, and comments, as well as the employer’s policies and practices.178 Critical inquiries in
175

See Eisenberg, supra note 166, at 270–72 (addressing the recovery of damages under Title VII).
See Elvia R. Arriola, “What’s the Big Deal?” Women in the New York City Construction Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970–1985, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21, 39 (1990) (noting
that in the 1970s, “[t]he commonality of the experience proved that sexual harassment was pandemic
and a function of gender”); Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997–FY
2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
sexual_harassment.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/U8LP-7X4F(last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (providing
statistical data and sexual harassment charge filings).
177
See Laura E. Diss, Note, Whether You “Like” It or Not: The Inclusion of Social Media Evidence
in Sexual Harassment Cases and How Courts Can Effectively Control It, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1841, 1848–49
(2013) (“[T]he success of a hostile work environment claim turns on the plaintiff proving that unwelcome sexual conduct is so severe or pervasive that it unreasonably interferes with her work performance
or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”); Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q6CA-JHSS (last visited Nov. 14, 2014 (“Harassment can include ‘sexual harassment’ or
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a
sexual nature.”).
178
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (“[W]e can say that whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These
may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threat176
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these cases include whether the company knew or should have known about
the harassment, and whether it took any remedial action. 179 Similarly, whether
the company had implemented and maintained an effective anti-harassment
policy will often go directly to the issue of liability in the case.180
Hostile work environments tend to impact several workers because the hostility will cut across an entire workforce. Thus, many workers are often affected
when employers permit hostility, resulting in class action claims.181 Sexual harassment will often not be appropriate for traditional class certification under
Rule 23(b), however, because individuals suffer different kinds and degrees of
harm. 182 The harassment will certainly vary with regard to intensity for each individual plaintiff. 183 Further, workers will perceive the harassment differently.184
Finally, specific acts of harassment may be targeted directly at individual workers. This type of discrimination is inherently individual in nature.
Nonetheless, classes asserting systemic hostile work environment claims
bear numerous similarities. Often, the same harassers will be involved in the
conduct, and courts may need to resolve the question of whether certain comments, jokes, or emails were sent to the workforce class-wide. 185 Also, the
question of what management knew and how it responded to the harassment
ening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.”). See generally Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D.
Minn. 1991) (certifying a class action in a hostile work environment case).
179
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754–65 (1998) (setting forth the test for
employer liability for sexual harassment); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793–810
(1998) (same).
180
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 807 (“While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need
for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense.”).
181
See Jason R. Bent, Systemic Harassment, 77 TENN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2009) (“Although the
viability of systemic harassment claims remains a largely unaddressed question, federal district courts
have generally agreed that systemic harassment claims are at least cognizable.”); Timothy G. Healy,
Comment, Sexual Pattern: Why a Pattern or Practice Theory of Liability Is Not an Appropriate
Framework for Claims of Sexual Harassment, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 537, 578 (2005) (“Despite the inherently individualized nature of sexual harassment claims, some federal trial courts have
held that a pattern or practice theory is an appropriate framework for pursuing claims of sexual harassment.”).
182
See Bent, supra note 181, at 168 (noting that employers often argue against class certification
in harassment cases because “hostile work environment claims necessarily require individualized
analysis of each plaintiff’s subjective perception of his or her work environment”).
183
See id. at 178–79 (explaining that some employees experience a single “discrete” act of discrimination, while other workers encounter repeated conduct).
184
See id. at 168.
185
See id. at 160 (“Private plaintiffs and the EEOC have articulated the systemic harassment
theory . . . [through] the same basic idea: the defendant employer allowed sexual harassment to exist
and persist in its workplace to such a degree that it constituted a ‘pattern or practice’ of harassment
that affected a class of employees . . . and failed to take remedial action, even after becoming aware of
the offensive behavior.”).
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will be critical to the entire litigation, because company practices for addressing discrimination will go directly to the question of liability. 186 Similarly, investigations into the harassment claims may impact numerous cases, and the
notes and records that develop from those investigations could have a classwide impact. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the validity and effectiveness of the company’s anti-harassment policy will impact all workers bringing
a sexual harassment claim against a common employer. 187 These common
questions in a sexual harassment case—which involve overlapping personnel,
practices, and policies—can be separated out from the individual litigation and
resolved on a class basis through the use of Rule 23(c)(4). Then, the remaining
questions in the case can still be addressed through individual litigation.188
For example, in a case involving allegations of company-wide workplace
hostility, it may be important to know: (1) whether the company distributed a
sexual harassment policy to all employees; (2) whether the company properly
trained the individuals identified in the policy to address complaints of harassment; and (3) whether upper management properly followed the harassment
policy. 189 These questions go directly to the employer’s defenses and liability. 190 Because these issues will impact employer liability each time an employee alleges harassment, they could be resolved a single time pursuant to
issue class certification. A jury could thus examine each of these issues and
render a finding that would bind the entire class. Then, the remaining issues
would be litigated like any other case of discrimination. 191
This use of issue class certification makes Rule 23(c)(4) extremely appealing. The issue class allows courts to address complex factual questions
only once, saving enormous judicial resources. And, it still permits the individual litigation to proceed as it would otherwise. Litigating the remaining issues separately is important given that each plaintiff will have undergone dif186
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754–65 (providing the test for liability in sexual harassment cases);
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–810 (same); Ann Carey Juliano, Harassing Women with Power: The Case
for Including Contra-Power Harassment Within Title VII, 87 B.U. L. REV. 491, 496 (2007) (“Employer liability for harassment by its employees turns on the organizational status of the harasser and
the employer’s response to the harassment.”).
187
See Juliano, supra note 186, at 553 (describing a federal district court case in which an employer had written and unwritten anti-harassment policies).
188
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
189
See EEOC v. Harbert–Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 510 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Although [the defendant] points out that it had an anti-sexual-harassment policy in place to address [the plaintiff’s]
problems, a reasonable jury could have concluded from the evidence that this policy was not enforced
in practice. Several employees testified that they were unaware that the policy even existed.”); Shaw
v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant exercised reasonable
care where the evidence showed in part that the defendant “distribute[d] its sexual harassment policy
to every one of its employees . . . [and] regularly trained its managers regarding its policy”).
190
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754–65 (setting forth the test for, and the affirmative defense to, employer liability for sexual harassment); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–810 (same).
191
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
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ferent experiences, and will have suffered varying degrees of harassment.192
Doing so will also lead to different findings on liability and diverse damages
with respect to individual plaintiffs.193 The typical systemic harassment claim,
then, will not be appropriate for traditional Rule 23(b) class treatment. It will,
however, often be extremely appropriate for issue class certification under
Rule 23(c)(4) on specific issues.
Sexual harassment thus provides an excellent example—in one of the
most commonly brought employment discrimination claims—of how Rule
23(c)(4) can help manage a systemic discrimination case. More broadly, classwide employment claims are particularly appropriate for issue certification. It
is therefore clear that Rule 23(c)(4) can help streamline litigation and bring
efficiency to systemic discrimination claims. Given the uncertainty of classbased litigation after Wal-Mart, the issue class is likely the best tool for the
courts and litigants to address common issues arising in the workplace.
C. McReynolds: Judge Posner’s View of the Issue Class
As outlined above, the issue class has enormous promise following WalMart. But the possibilities for plaintiffs are more than theoretical. In fact,
Judge Posner recently invoked Rule 23(c)(4) in systemic litigation brought
against one of the nation’s largest financial services firms.
In 2012, in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that issues raised by
plaintiffs in an employment case can be certified under Rule 23(c)(4) and decided on a class-wide basis. 194 The McReynolds court considered a race discrimination case brought on behalf of seven hundred black brokers.195 The
plaintiffs alleged that Merrill Lynch had discriminated against them under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by enacting certain company policies. 196
The plaintiffs moved for issue class certification under Rule 23(c)(4), asking
that the court decide the “common issue” of “whether the defendant has engaged and is engaging in practices that have a disparate impact . . . on the
members of the class, in violation of federal antidiscrimination law.” 197 The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied certification, and
the Seventh Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal on the issue.198
192

See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Employees of either
gender may experience discrimination or harassment in a variety of different forms . . . .”).
193
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012) (damages provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
194
672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338.
195
Id. at 488.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 483.
198
Id. at 484.
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Specifically, the McReynolds plaintiffs alleged that the company had
adopted two policies that discriminated against black brokers. 199 First, the
company had adopted a “teaming” policy whereby brokers were permitted—
but not required—to organize teams in particular offices. 200 Although many
brokers chose to work independently, those members on corporate teams
“share[d] clients” and attempted to “gain access to additional clients.” 201 The
brokers—rather than an office supervisor or director—formed the teams themselves. 202 Although brokers could be successful working alone, joining a team
was seen as a way of doing well at the company. 203
Second, the plaintiffs challenged Merrill Lynch’s “account distribution”
policy. 204 Under that policy, when a broker departed from the company, that
broker’s accounts were redistributed to other employees. 205 Certain criteria,
which measured the competing brokers’ prior success, helped determine who
received the accounts.206
Those two policies ultimately worked together to impact how brokers
were evaluated. 207 Moreover, a broker’s evaluation played a part in pay and
promotion at the company. 208 The plaintiffs maintained that both policies were
applied in a way that discriminated against black workers and impacted their
pay. 209 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that white brokers “are more comfortable” working and teaming with other white brokers.210 Although race did
not always motivate how brokers were chosen to join a team, “emotions and
preconceptions,” rather than “objective criteria,” played a major role. 211 Thus,
although management may not have had any racial motivation in adopting this
policy, the policy nonetheless resulted in an adverse disparate impact against
black employees when they were excluded from the more profitable teams. 212
Similarly, the plaintiffs also alleged that the account distribution policy
had a disparate impact against black workers. 213 Because white brokers were
disproportionately members of more successful teams, their revenues tended to

199

Id. at 488.
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
See id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 488–89.
206
See id. at 489.
207
See id. at 488–89.
208
Id. at 489.
209
See id.
210
Id.
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See id.
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See id.
213
Id. at 489–90.
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be higher than those of black brokers. 214 Thus, when accounts were redistributed at the company, white workers received those accounts at a disproportionately high rate. 215 The two policies thus worked together to create a “vicious
cycle” where the “spiral effect” was “disadvantageous to black brokers.” 216
African-American brokers thus earned less than their white counterparts at the
company. 217
Judge Posner, writing for the panel, determined that the question of
whether these two polices violated Title VII should be answered as part of an
issue class under Rule 23(c)(4). 218 For the first time, the court analyzed the
question specifically in the context of the Wal-Mart decision. It noted that it
may seem “perverse” to consider certifying the class in light of the Supreme
Court’s apprehension of systemic litigation, but noted that the Court’s decision
provided substantial guidance on the class action mechanism. 219
Judge Posner emphasized that although there was no evidence of discriminatory intent, such intent is unnecessary in a disparate impact case brought
under Title VII. 220 The court further noted that the question at this stage of the
proceedings is whether the disparate impact claims are “most efficiently determined on a class-wide basis rather than in 700 individual lawsuits.”221 Given that the two policies may work together in causing the discrimination, and
that the policies may have an “incremental causal [discriminatory] effect,” they
are most appropriately decided as part of a single suit.222
In the decision, Judge Posner differentiated between an issue class claim,
like the one asserted in McReynolds, and a broader class action case under
Rule 23(b), like the one brought in Wal-Mart. 223 He explained:
Obviously a single proceeding . . . could not resolve class members’
claims. Each class member would have to prove that his compensation had been adversely affected by the corporate policies, and by
how much. . . . But at least it wouldn’t be necessary in each of those
trials to determine whether the challenged practices were unlawful.

214

Id.
Id.
216
Id.
217
See id.
218
Id. at 491.
219
See id. at 487–88.
220
Id. at 490 (“There is no indication that the corporate level of Merrill Lynch . . . wants to discriminate against black brokers. . . . But in a disparate impact case the presence or absence of discriminatory intent is irrelevant . . . .”).
221
Id.
222
See id.
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See id. at 490–91.
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Rule 23(c)(4) . . . . [thus brings efficiency] on a class-wide basis
. . . . 224
The court also addressed a critical policy question that Wal-Mart raised:
whether the enormity of the certified class could force the defendant to settle
the matter. 225 Unlike the broad Wal-Mart-type class action brought under Rule
23(b), however, issue class certification does not raise the stakes to the level of
requiring a defendant to gamble “one’s company on a single jury verdict.” 226
Rather, the financial services firm in McReynolds “is in no danger of being
destroyed” if it receives an adverse verdict, particularly where only seven hundred plaintiffs are involved. 227
In overturning the district court and permitting the issue class, the Seventh Circuit noted that it had “trouble seeing the downside of the limited class
action treatment.” 228 The court thus certified the class under Rule 23(c)(4) and
allowed the specific issues the plaintiffs raised to be decided on a class-wide
basis. 229 The court further advised that if it decided the class-wide issues in
favor of the plaintiffs, hundreds of individual suits for monetary damages
might follow. 230 But such suits would be streamlined, as the court would not
have to revisit whether the company violated Title VII in each individual
case. 231
In the end, it was clear that Judge Posner saw the value and role of the issue class under Rule 23(c)(4). Although he clearly understood and considered
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in rejecting a Rule 23(b) class in Wal-Mart,
Judge Posner saw no “downside” to the more “limited class action” brought in
McReynolds. 232 Certifying narrow issues in the case would not threaten the
existence of the company or cause it to settle, and would help to streamline
future litigation in the individual cases.233 Indeed, it is worth noting that were
the defendant to win on the class-wide questions that were certified, the case
itself would be over, which would prevent the unnecessary litigation of hundreds of federal suits.

224

Id.
See id. at 484, 490–91; see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (finding that the plaintiffs’
claims for backpay could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because, in part, “Wal-Mart will not be
entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims”).
226
See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491.
227
See id.
228
Id. at 492.
229
Id. The court further allowed the plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief on the two policies pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). See id. at 483, 491–92.
230
Id. at 492.
231
See id.
232
See id.
233
Id. at 491–92.
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The McReynolds case, then, provides a superb example of how systemic
litigation can still thrive after Wal-Mart, particularly in the employment discrimination context. As already addressed, where an employer permits employment discrimination to occur in a single instance, it is more likely to be
widespread across the company. Common management and policies at a business thus provide common facts that may overlap between cases. Although the
specifics of any individual case may vary among plaintiffs, there will be instances where courts can decide common polices and issues uniformly. As
Judge Posner notes, where it is possible to resolve these common issues on a
class-wide basis, there is a substantial opportunity to streamline the entire process and bring judicial efficiency to the case. 234 Rule 23(c)(4) provides the
procedural mechanism to do so. Even after Wal-Mart, then, the procedural
rules allow for plaintiffs to pursue—and prevail—in having specific issues decided on a class-wide basis.
D. Wal-Mart Revisited
With a more thorough understanding of the issue class and how it has
been applied, it is worth revisiting the Wal-Mart case under Rule 23(c)(4). As
already discussed, Wal-Mart was brought as a broad class action on behalf of
one and a half million plaintiffs seeking to certify their case as a single uniform
proceeding under Rule 23(b). 235 The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this
certification, finding that there was no commonality among the claims. 236
There was simply too much variance across the stores and plaintiffs in the case
to warrant class treatment. 237
There has been substantial debate as to whether this case was properly decided. 238 Putting this debate aside, however, it is fair to ask what the case would
have looked like if it had been brought as a more limited class action under Rule
23(c)(4). As McReynolds demonstrates, the issue class has far-reaching potential
for employment discrimination claims. 239 The facts of Wal-Mart provide an excellent example of how the issue class could help reinvigorate systemic workplace claims. It is useful to reexamine these facts from the perspective of Rule
23(c)(4) to better understand how that Rule can be used in practice.
One alternative way that the Wal-Mart plaintiffs could have proceeded,
then, would have been to pursue a more limited class certification on specific
234

See id.
See 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
236
Id. at 2556–57.
237
See id.
238
See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the academic response to the WalMart decision).
239
See generally 672 F.3d 482 (reasoning that the issue class under Rule 23(c)(4) can streamline
litigation without forcing defendants to settle).
235
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issues raised in the case. Although there are a myriad of strategic ways to formulate specific issues across the stores, there are two particular possibilities
that jump quickly to mind. 240 First, the plaintiffs could have sought to certify
only the question of whether the discretion given to management in determining pay and promotion issues discriminated against female employees.241 Second, the plaintiffs could further have sought to certify this issue only as to specific stores in specific regions of the country. If the issue was resolved in favor
of the plaintiffs on these claims, the individual cases could have proceeded
against the company to determine the appropriate level of damages. 242 The
question of the validity of the pay and promotion policy, however, would not
have needed to be reexamined.
Thus, the issue in the case would have been narrower in two senses. First,
certification would have only been sought on the single issue of the store policy. Second, certification would have only applied to a narrow geographic region. Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the plaintiffs would have been
far more likely to prevail on this type of limited certification. Specifically, the
Court repeatedly emphasized that the proposed class was simply too big and
too diverse to permit certification. 243 As the Court explained, “Other than the
bare existence of delegated discretion, respondents have identified no ‘specific
employment practice’—much less one that ties all their 1.5 million claims together.” 244 The claims thus varied too much across too many stores around the
country to warrant class treatment. 245 Underscoring the diversity and size of
the class, the Court noted:
Some managers will claim that the availability of women, or qualified women, or interested women, in their stores’ area does not mirror the national or regional statistics. And almost all of them will
claim to have been applying some sex-neutral, performance-based
criteria—whose nature and effects will differ from store to store. 246

240

It is important to note that this Article does not address all of the possible ways that an issue
class could have been certified in Wal-Mart. Indeed, there are numerous issues that could have been
certified in the case. Rather, this Article provides, by way of example, one specific and valuable way
of certifying an important issue in the case under Rule 23(c)(4).
241
See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547 (“Pay and promotion decisions at Wal-Mart are generally
committed to local managers’ broad discretion . . . .”).
242
Conversely, if the issue was resolved in favor of the defendant, it would end the inquiry and
the company would prevail.
243
See id. at 2555–56.
244
Id. The Court further emphasized the size of the class, noting that “[w]e are presented with one
of the most expansive class actions ever.” Id. at 2547. And, the Court noted that “[i]n a company of
Wal-Mart’s size and geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise
their discretion in a common way without some common direction.” Id. at 2555.
245
Id. at 2555–56.
246
Id. at 2555 (emphasis added).
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That problem would cease to exist under the issue class proposed here.
By choosing to proceed against particular stores or stores in particular regions,
there would likely be many more common elements to the individual claims.
For individual stores, there would be a common set of managers, employees,
and policies. For regional claims, multiple stores may share common employees or supervisors, and managerial staff may discuss and share pay and promotion policies. The issue addressed would thus be singular: whether the pay and
promotion policy at the store (or in the region) adversely impacted female
workers.
By litigating the case through this more limited class mechanism, the
Court’s objections to the class treatment in Wal-Mart would fall by the wayside. The Court’s primary concern—the lack of commonality in the case—
would not be a problem where a single issue was sought to be resolved in an
individual store or in a geographically narrow grouping of stores.247 Rather, the
targeted geographical scope of the class would help bring “some glue” to hold
the “employment decisions” in the case together.248
Similarly, the pure size of the class sought in Wal-Mart would have
threatened the business itself. 249 By pursuing a more limited issue class in the
case, this threat would no longer exist. Like the defendant in McReynolds,
then, Wal-Mart would be “in no danger of being destroyed” if it received an
adverse verdict on the issue certified, particularly where the classes are more
limited in nature. 250 A narrower issue decided with fewer plaintiffs substantially limits the risk for the company.
At the same time, there would be a number of benefits to pursuing the issue class. Most importantly, the certification of the issue would help streamline
the proceedings. It would allow the most important issue in the case—the legality of Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion policies—to be resolved on a broader
basis across regional stores. As the case stands now, the courts may be flooded
with one and a half million claims from the individual plaintiffs that would
need to be resolved. 251 The issue class would help consolidate this litigation,
and would allow the issue to be resolved in a uniform way. Additionally, there
would still be an incentive for the defendant to settle the case where the issue
class has been certified. 252 A defendant may not want to risk an adverse ruling
247
See id. (expressing doubt that the plaintiff could demonstrate a “uniform, store-by-store [pay]
disparity” on a national scale).
248
See id. at 2552.
249
See id. at 2547–57 (repeatedly emphasizing the enormous size of the purported class).
250
See 672 F.3d at 491.
251
See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (denying the certification of the class but allowing individual
claims to proceed against the company).
252
Cf. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2064 (1995)
(“[V]irtually all class actions not dismissed on motion are settled.”).
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in those courts, and the issue class would thus encourage settlement. Nevertheless, the risk of losing the case would not be as daunting to the company, and
any settlement would likely be more reasonable in nature.253
It is thus interesting to consider what Wal-Mart would have looked like
had the plaintiffs pursued an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4) rather than a
broader class under Rule 23(b). More limited class treatment of the case would
still have created substantial judicial economies for the courts and litigants,
and would still have encouraged settlement in the case. At the same time, however, the issue class would not present make-or-break litigation for the company. 254 Considering Wal-Mart in this light reveals an important lesson for future
employment discrimination litigants pursuing systemic claims: where a class
may be too large or varied to warrant broad class treatment, the plaintiffs
should strongly consider a narrowed approach under Rule 23(c)(4).
Ultimately, it is impossible to know how the Supreme Court would have
reacted to an “issue class” brought against Wal-Mart, and whether the Court
would have upheld that type of certification. Further, there are numerous other
ways that an issue class could have been pursued than the one set forth here.
Nonetheless, the objections the Court and litigants in Wal-Mart raised are less
likely to exist with the more limited issue class, and it is far more likely that
the Court would have approved the litigation. This is particularly true because
the case itself was decided by a narrow 5-4 margin. 255 Certainly, the lower
courts, like the Seventh Circuit in McReynolds, could see Rule 23(c)(4) as a
way of helping consolidate massive litigation while still heeding the Supreme
Court’s warnings in Wal-Mart.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISSUE CLASS
In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court held that a
class of one and a half million plaintiffs could not be certified under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). 256 As already noted in this Article, there is no
complete substitute for the traditional Rule 23(b) class action.257 Nonetheless,
in assessing the legal landscape post Wal-Mart, issue class certification is the
best remaining tool available for workers to pursue systemic employment discrimination claims. The issue class presents a number of advantages for the
courts and litigants, but there are also some noteworthy drawbacks. This Part
first addresses the benefits of using the issue class in employment discrimina253
See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491–92 (discussing how issue class certification presents less
risk to defendants).
254
See id.
255
See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2546.
256
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011).
257
See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text.
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tion cases. 258 Next, it addresses the drawbacks of the Rule. 259 Finally, it situates the discussion within the context of the broader academic scholarship. 260
Perhaps the issue class’s most substantial benefit is the flexibility it brings
to the judiciary. 261 Rule 23(c)(4) provides the courts substantial freedom in
managing a class case. 262 Specifically, the trial judge can examine the case and
decide how best to separate out those issues that are ripe for collective determination. And, because an issue class can be certified at any point in the case,
it provides enormous latitude for the court to determine how a systemic case
should proceed.
By permitting this type of flexibility, Rule 23(c)(4) streamlines litigation. 263 It separates common issues in a case for collective determination, while
allowing the remainder of each case to proceed individually. 264 This process
makes the proceedings more efficient and efficacious.265 Specifically, it avoids
duplicate litigation because common issues are resolved in a single action. The
process therefore saves judicial and litigant resources, and streamlines systemic litigation.
Employment discrimination cases are particularly appropriate for Rule
23(c)(4) certification. 266 As discussed, these claims’ inherent commonality—
including common policies, personnel, and procedures—is well-suited for issue
class certification. The issue class should thus strongly be considered in any systemic employment discrimination case, as use of Rule 23(c)(4) can streamline
the proceedings, and allow the case to proceed in a more efficient and effective
manner. Similarly, as there are many individualized inquiries that must be addressed in employment cases, use of the traditional Rule 23(b) mechanism is
often inappropriate for these cases, as Wal-Mart clearly shows. 267 As courts become more focused on the commonality requirement following Wal-Mart, then,
Rule 23(c)(4) will become a much more important tool for pursuing class-wide
workplace claims.

258

See infra notes 261–267 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 268–275 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 277–286 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text (discussing the flexibility of Rule 23(c)(4)).
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See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790 (noting the “additional flexibility” the issue
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Despite the great promise of the issue class, however, there are also many
drawbacks relevant to traditional class certification under Rule 23(b).268 Most
notably, the issue class is not as efficient as Rule 23(b) certification of an entire
class. Because Rule 23(c)(4) only allows certification of a portion of the case,
it is simply less efficient, as a number of issues in each case will still have to
be resolved on an individual basis. 269 Issue class certification can thus be more
cumbersome compared to the traditional class action.
Additionally, from the plaintiff’s perspective, issue class claims yield
smaller settlements than traditional class claims. 270 This is because a class certified under Rule 23(c)(4) will typically not concern employers as much as traditional class actions brought under Rule 23(b), as the adverse resolution of a
particular issue may still permit the employer to avoid liability and/or substantial damages in the case. As Judge Posner acknowledged, certifying narrow
issues in a case will likely not threaten a company’s existence. 271 Employers
may therefore not be as eager to settle a case certified under Rule 23(c)(4).
Similarly, many individual employment discrimination cases arising out
of the same facts may have only marginal value.272 Although some issues can
be certified on a class basis in these cases, the damages portion of each case
will likely proceed in an individualized manner. Thus, many plaintiffs with
smaller dollar claims may be reluctant to pursue systemic litigation that does
not arise out of Rule 23(b) litigation, as there may be little financial incentive
to do so. 273 This will allow some employers to avoid feeling the full impact of
their discrimination under the civil rights laws, as not all plaintiffs will join in
the litigation even where a particular issue has been certified. Similarly, Rule
23(b) class claims allow a more relaxed approach to the administrative filing
requirements of the Federal Rules for employment discrimination claims. 274
Rule 23(c)(4) is likely not as permissive, and many potential plaintiffs that
268
See Romberg, supra note 96, at 299 (acknowledging that global class actions have some advantages over issue class certification).
269
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (permitting certification of specific issue(s) in a case), with
id. 23(b) (permitting class-wide certification of an entire case).
270
See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (noting that issue class certification imposes less pressure on defendants to settle than traditional class claims). Class action cases are often settled prior to trial. See
Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 156 (2006) (“[N]early all class actions that
survive dispositive motions settle.”).
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See McReynolds, 672 F. 3d at 491–92.
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See Moss & Ruan, supra note 71, at 561 (“Employment claims typically seek modest individual damages . . . .”).
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See id. at 562 (discussing the difficulty of pursuing low-dollar cases on an individual basis in
employment cases and noting that “individual litigation requires one plaintiff to shoulder all litigation
costs and risks herself”).
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See Seiner, supra note 7, at 1363 (“[T]he administrative requirements (such as filing timely
discrimination charges) will likely be more relaxed in the class setting.”).
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have not satisfied the administrative requirements of the statute will fall
through the cracks of the case. 275 Again, this will result in a smaller class size
and a reduced impact on the employer for its wrongdoing.
In the end, there is simply no complete substitute for the traditional class
claim. The reality of Wal-Mart, however, is that the traditional class action is
forever changed for employment discrimination plaintiffs. These plaintiffs
need solutions to the problems the Supreme Court’s decision created. And the
issue class is simply the best procedural tool available for permitting workplace plaintiffs to pursue systemic discrimination claims. Despite its shortcomings, then, the issue class offers enormous promise for employment discrimination plaintiffs. The issue class offers flexibility to the courts, and streamlined,
efficient litigation for the parties involved. Rule 23(c)(4) should thus be strongly considered in any systemic workplace litigation, as the issue class is an effective tool for employment plaintiffs.
Finally, it should be noted that there is nothing prohibiting plaintiffs from
bringing a traditional Rule 23(b) class action, and then pursuing an issue class
if the traditional class is denied.276 Thus, from a strategic standpoint, plaintiffs
need not decide at the outset of the case between Rule 23(b) and Rule 23(c)(4).
Instead, if the plaintiffs believe that they should pursue the case as a traditional
class action, they should proceed on that basis. If certification is denied, the
plaintiffs can still pursue the issue class at a subsequent time. Indeed, one of
the great benefits of the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class is that it can be used at any
time in the case to help streamline the proceedings. Plaintiffs thus need not
gamble by asking the court for either a traditional class or the issue class, and
can instead seek both forms of certification in the alternative.
As already discussed, much has been written on Wal-Mart generally.277 The
vast majority of this scholarship has denounced the decision as problematic for
civil rights plaintiffs. Little has been written, however, on potential solutions to
the Supreme Court’s decision. Shortly after Wal-Mart was decided, several
scholars began discussing possible ways to address the problems facing systemic
employment discrimination plaintiffs.278 One scholar suggested that plaintiffs
could pursue class action claims smaller in size than the class in Wal-Mart to
litigate these cases effectively. 279 Another scholar made several suggestions for
plaintiffs to consider when bringing systemic discrimination claims.280 This schol275

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
See Romberg, supra note 96, at 268 (noting that issue class certification is a valuable tool
available to plaintiffs at multiple stages of the litigation).
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See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (outlining the views of various scholars on the
Wal-Mart case).
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See Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455,
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ar highlighted different procedural mechanisms that plaintiffs could pursue, and
also raised the possibility of an enhanced role for governmental litigation and the
potential for congressional intervention. 281
Although these early voices briefly raised some possible solutions to the
Wal-Mart dilemma, the legal academy has primarily focused on the problem
itself rather than ways of resolving the issue. This Article continues the discussion that other scholars began, and explores how workplace plaintiffs can best
proceed after the Supreme Court’s decision. This Article thoroughly explains
that issue class certification is the best tool available to employment discrimination plaintiffs and highlights the benefits and drawbacks of that potential tool.
To date, the academic scholarship has not identified Rule 23(c)(4) as a
possible response to Wal-Mart. Indeed, very little had been written on issue
class certification even prior to the Supreme Court’s decision. Moreover, the
existing scholarship is conflicting. For example, one scholar has criticized the
expansive view of Rule 23(c)(4) that some courts have adopted.282 This scholar
argues that the Rule, “in its current form, simply cannot authorize an issue
class action end-run around the predominance requirement for class actions
that otherwise would fail to satisfy that requirement.” 283 In contrast, other
commentators believe that Rule 23(c)(4) should play a larger role in class action litigation, and can be more effectively used than the traditional Rule 23(b)
type class. 284 One such commentator argues that the class action should not
result in “an all-or-nothing decision to aggregate individual cases.”285 Instead,
issue class certification can be used to isolate specific issues to be litigated.286
Regardless of how issue class certification was used prior to Wal-Mart,
Rule 23(c)(4) now offers the best available way for plaintiffs to pursue systemic discrimination claims. The Supreme Court’s decision has essentially resolved any conflict as to whether the traditional class action or the issue class
is more effective for employment discrimination claims. Because Wal-Mart
substantially raises the bar for class action workplace plaintiffs, these litigants
may be best served by pursuing a more limited systemic claim in the form of
the issue class.

281
See id. As Professor Melissa Hart properly notes, “For the time being . . . it is essential to
consider other solutions to the bind that the Wal-Mart decision has incorrectly put the lower courts
and litigants in.” Id. at 474.
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See Hines, supra note 121, at 763.
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CONCLUSION
There is a growing body of literature criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart. This scholarship emphasizes that the case may undermine
the civil rights protections of workers across the country. The arguments these
scholars have set forth are well founded, but it is now time to move past this
debate. A more helpful line of inquiry should focus on how plaintiffs can navigate around the Supreme Court’s decision. This Article offers a discussion of
the benefits and drawbacks of the best tool currently available for pursuing
systemic employment discrimination claims: issue class certification. Although
the traditional class action under Rule 23(b) remains the preferred mechanism
for systemic litigation, all workplace plaintiffs should strongly consider the
issue class following Wal-Mart.
This Article seeks to spark a dialogue on the ways that Rule 23(c)(4) can
be used to assist civil rights claimants in a post Wal-Mart world. A discussion
of how to litigate cases after the Supreme Court’s decision—rather than a discussion of the flaws of the case itself—is far more helpful to plaintiffs pursuing employment discrimination claims. Although the issue class is not the only
way to litigate class-wide workplace cases, it is likely the best way. Beyond
offering a full discussion of the issue class, then, this Article also invites a dialogue on any additional means of addressing the Supreme Court’s decision.
Wal-Mart has unquestionably changed the playing field. It is now time to reassess how plaintiffs should play the game.

